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INTRODUCTION
In January 2009, Western Digital Corporation began shipment of the
Caviar Green-the world's first two-terabyte hard drive.' This drive space
. J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2010. I would like to thank Professor
Deborah Denno for her insight and support as my advisor for this Note, Professor Katherine
Strandburg for her immensely helpful comments, and finally my family and friends for their
undivided love and support.
1. Press Room - Western Digital Corp., http://www.wdc.com/en/company/glossary.asp
(last visited Oct. 8, 2009). A terabyte is equivalent to 1,000 gigabytes.
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is roughly equivalent to 129 million pages of Microsoft Word files,2 -
enough to fill the books contained on three floors of a typical academic li-
brary3-- or up to 400,000 digital photos.4 Far from the room-sized mon-
strosities of early computer technology, the Caviar Green stands just one
inch tall, six inches long, four inches wide, and weighs less than two
pounds.5 Only a few years ago the average hard drive capacity was merely
four percent of what is currently available.6 While a technological marvel,
this new massive storage capability also creates interesting and complex
problems regarding individual privacy and the Fourth Amendment.
The most pressing issue concerning hard drives and individual privacy is
how they are conceptualized within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
How courts decide to classify hard drives will have dramatic consequences
on the security of the information stored on them. Federal courts only be-
gan analyzing this problem a decade ago, but during the ten years that have
elapsed since the first major decision, computer technology grew exponen-
tially.
The majority of courts treat the entire hard drive as a single closed con-
tainer.7 Professor Orin Kerr has deemed this the "physical box" approach. 8
Looking at hard drives in this way renders the zone of a Fourth Amend-
ment search to include the entire hard drive-no matter how large. In other
words, a search warrant for one e-mail message has the effect of making
everything on that hard drive eligible for investigators to examine. This
view has the practical consequence of enabling government agents to ac-
cess all of the information stored on a hard drive regardless of whether that
information has anything to do with the reason the computer is being
searched.
Under the minority approach, individual files or folders on a hard drive
are treated as separate entities. This approach treats the individual files or
folders as the zone of the search and has been described as the "virtual file"
2. Lexis Nexis Discovery Services, Fact Sheet, http://www.lexisnexis.com/
applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/whitePapers/ADI_FS_PageslnAGigabyte.pdf (last visited Oct.
8, 2009).
3. See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARv. L. REV. 531,
542 (2005).
4. WD Caviar Green - Western Digital Corp., http://www.wdc.com/en/products/
products.asp?DrivelD=576 (last visited Oct. 8, 2009).
5. WD Caviar Green, supra note 3.
6. See Kerr, supra note 3, at 542 (noting that in 2005 the average hard drive capacity
was eighty gigabytes).
7. See United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 458 (5th Cir. 2001). See also United
States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 978 n.14 (9th Cir. 2006).
8. Kerr, supra note 3, at 554.
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approach. 9 In practice this means that each file or folder, depending on
how broad or narrow the proper zone of search was drawn, would consti-
tute a separate container in terms of traditional Fourth Amendment doc-
trine.
Recently, in United States v. Crist, a district court tried to safeguard in-
dividual rights by characterizing hard drives in what it believed to be an al-
ternative to the closed container and virtual file approaches.' Crist dealt
with a government search of a computer that had been previously accessed
by a private party and the issue of how far, if at all, the government could
exceed the scope of the properly conducted private search. The court ex-
plicitly held that a hard drive is not analogous to a single closed container
and that viewing it as such would impermissibly jeopardize privacy
rights." Importantly, however, Crist held that the individual platters--or
smaller physical subsections of the hard drive-were analogous to closed
containers.12 Accordingly, the court ruled that the government could not
search an entire hard drive consisting of multiple platters. While admirable
in its effort, the Crist court inadvertently advanced the closed container ap-
proach with the underlying rationale for its new approach to hard drive
searches. If other courts adopt the Crist logic, the legal system runs the
risk of inadvertently perpetuating the closed container logic in a new doc-
trine that purportedly seeks to safeguard individual privacy.
Not surprisingly, almost all of the cases dealing with courts' conceptu-
alizations of hard drives revolve around child pornography. Because child
pornographers are unsympathetic defendants, this concentration of case law
is arguably one of the main reasons the issue has not been thoroughly ad-
dressed. One would not expect a large contingent of the legal world to
rally around the rights of individuals who possess such disturbing material.
It is difficult for any judge to craft a rule that excludes evidence of such
despicable acts when the government has a seemingly rational justification
for carrying out the search in the manner it does. These vulnerabilities,
however, do not only impact child pornographers. Given the increasing
technological changes surrounding hard drives and data storage, the child
pornographer defendant of today may very well turn into the business ex-
ecutive defendant of tomorrow. Businesses that store massive amounts of
sensitive material on central servers or databases are at risk. Professionals
9. See id.
10. No. 1:07-CR-211, 2008 WL 4682806 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2008).
11. Seeid. at*10.
12. See id. ("[A] hard drive is comprised of many platters, or magnetic data storage
units, mounted together. Each platter, as opposed to the hard drive in its entirety, is analo-
gous to a single disk as discussed in Runyan.").
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who conduct sensitive operations and communicate via e-mail are at risk.
In fact, anyone who stores important data on a computer is at risk. That the
cases that have so far reached the federal courts have dealt almost exclu-
sively with despicable actions should not serve as a bar to the development
of Fourth Amendment doctrine that properly balances the privacy concerns
of individuals against the needs of law enforcement officials moving for-
ward.
This Note posits that the majority approach, in which hard drives are
characterized as closed containers, is not viable. Such a classification can-
not be justified as the amount of data that can be stored on a single hard
drive skyrockets and individuals increasingly rely on computer storage for
sensitive information. Giving government agents carte blanche authority to
sift through enormous amounts of personal information 13 has no parallel in
traditional Fourth Amendment practice. When police obtain a warrant to
search a home they may not search any and all containers they discover in
the process. All further searches of discovered containers must be sup-
ported by probable cause. 14 Defining the proper zone of search on hard
drives as individual files or folders will better serve to protect the privacy
rights of individuals while at the same time giving government authorities
enough autonomy to not impair their investigatory duty. As technology
grows and more hard drive cases are brought under the Fourth Amendment,
criminal defense lawyers will develop stronger arguments in favor of sup-
pressing evidence found as the fruits of these general searches. Moving
away from viewing hard drives as closed containers will also protect law
enforcement by removing uncertainty as to the future admissibility of evi-
dence uncovered during computer searches.
This Note will examine the history of both the search warrant require-
ment and private search doctrine, as well as analyze how the conceptualiza-
tion of hard drives impacts individual privacy in both contexts. Part I ex-
13. Proponents of the closed container approach note the fact that a warrant authorizing
a search for business records or "writings" permits the search of an entire hard drive. See
United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 581 (D. Vt. 1998); Thomas K. Clancy, The
Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and a
Primer, 75 Miss. L.J. 193, 197-99 (2005) (discussing the broad scope of a document search
under Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), and discussing the courts that adhere to
this view). This business records doctrine, however, cannot be extended to computers be-
cause of the fundamental difference between a filing cabinet, where papers must be physi-
cally examined to ascertain their relevancy, and a computer, where programs and methods
are available to limit such intrusion.
14. See United States v. Bonitz, 826 F.2d 954, 957 (10th Cir. 1987) ("It is fundamental
that, absent some special exception, all containers and packages will receive the full protec-
tion of the fourth amendment during a police search." (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753, 762-65 (1979))).
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amines the history of how courts have viewed hard drives and provides a
brief primer on the technology that operates within hard drives in order to
demonstrate that such devices are not simply analogous to closed contain-
ers. Part II examines the rationales behind the approaches courts have
taken and discusses the problems inherent in both the traditional ap-
proaches and the new approach taken in Crist.15 Finally, Part III proposes
adopting a modified virtual file approach based on the fact that the closed
container approach will grow increasingly problematic as the average size
of hard drives increases. The cases treating hard drives as closed contain-
ers were decided nearly a decade ago 16 when the average hard drive size
was just a fraction of what it is today. Adhering to the general rule that
hard drive capacity doubles every two years, 17 it is not beyond the realm of
possibility to suggest that the home consumer will be able to purchase ten-
terabyte hard drives in the next five years. That means the amount of data
left vulnerable to a government search based on a supposedly narrow and
particular warrant will be over one hundred times greater than when the
first case analogizing a hard drive to a closed container was decided.18 Ad-
hering to the closed container analogy, or even the virtual file approach as
it has been adopted by the federal courts, will expose massive amounts of
data to government officials-more data than the courts that first examined
the issue could ever have imagined. Moreover, continuing to follow either
approach will leave law enforcement officers lost as to what evidence will
be admissible or subject to suppression.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVATE SEARCH
DOCTRINE AND SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures." 9 Part I of this Note examines the historical development of
this maxim as it applies to modem computer searches. Part L.A discusses
the development of the search warrant requirement. Part I.B focuses on the
historical development of the Fourth Amendment's private search doctrine.
15. Crist, No. 1:07-CR-211, 2008 WL 4682806.
16. United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 458 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Barth,
26 F. Supp. 2d 929, 936 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
17. See Kerr, supra note 3, at 569.
18. Barth was decided in 1998 and the average hard drive capacity in 2005 was 120
gigabytes. Based on a backwards extrapolation of the generally accepted "capacity doubles
every two years" theory, the average capacity of a hard drive in 1998 would have been ap-
proximately fifteen gigabytes. See Kerr, supra note 3, at 569.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Finally, Part I.C briefly introduces the technology behind contemporary
computer hard drives.
A. The Search Warrant Requirement
In 1967 the Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States20 and set forth
the modem idea that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not
places."-2 1 In his oft-quoted concurrence, Justice Harlan explained this ad-
age to mean that the Fourth Amendment protects an individual when she
has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in whatever is being searched. 22
He articulated a two-prong test for determining whether or not an individ-
ual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. First, the defendant must have
exhibited an actual expectation of privacy-the subjective prong-and sec-
ond, that expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable-the objective prong.23 The test as currently articulated by the
Supreme Court states that "a Fourth Amendment search does not occur...
unless 'the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the
object of the challenged search,' and 'society [is] willing to recognize that
expectation as reasonable.' 24
Government agents must obtain a valid search warrant in order to search
an area in which an individual has manifested an objective privacy interest
that society recognizes as reasonable. 25 Although the Court has recognized
numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement, this Note assumes that no
such exceptions apply in the situations presented.26 In the context of
searching computers, one of the most important aspects of the Fourth
Amendment is the particularity requirement.27 The particularity require-
ment compels government agents to specifically describe the area to be
searched as well as the object to be seized. There is little case law on how
20. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
21. Id. at 351.
22. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 361.
24. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 211 (1976)).
25. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
26. Some examples of exceptions to the warrant requirement include exigent circum-
stances, plain view, and search by consent. See generally 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H.
ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 3.2, 3.5, 3.10 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ].
27. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall is-
sue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV
(emphasis added).
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the particularity requirement applies to virtual searches, but a brief history
of its application in the physical realm will be illustrative.
In the context of physical searches, the Supreme Court has construed the
particularity requirement to mean, when executing a search warrant, "noth-
ing [should be] left to the discretion of the officer."28 Further, "knowledge
that some objects connected with criminal activity are to be found on cer-
tain premises is no basis for permitting an unrestricted search of those
premises. Rather, an intrusion upon the occupant's expectation of privacy
in those premises should extend no further than is necessary to find particu-
lar objects . *."..29 Absolute perfection in the description of the area and
object to be searched is not required; it "is enough if the description is such
that the officer with a search warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place intended."3 ° This explanation is by no means fool-
proof, and "problems arise when a facially sufficient description is deter-
mined to be less precise than was assumed."'" When officers obtain a
seemingly valid warrant, but discover later that the address or apartment
number may be incorrect, there is not much controversy in allowing them
to make common-sense judgments about the proper location to be searched.
For example, if the warrant specifies "John Doe's blue house at 415 Lake
Road" and there is a blue house belonging to John Doe at 451 Lake Road,
courts are willing to let the officers involved make judgment calls and exe-
cute the search warrant accordingly.
32
These problems are more pronounced in the virtual context. For exam-
ple, it has been argued that "[t]he particularity requirement reflects a physi-
cal concern," the rationale being that government officials cannot engage in
general searches if the specific location and physical object targeted are
named.33 In the virtual world of hard drives, however, the traditional par-
ticularity concept does not serve to prohibit general searches nearly as ef-
fectively. A government official can request a search warrant for "child
pornography" on "John Doe's computer." In the physical world this is as
particular as possible-the incriminating material is certainly somewhere
on the physical device. In the virtual world, however, the same search war-
rant leaves extensive amounts of information susceptible to a search that
would otherwise be outside of the government's reach. For example, if law
28. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
29. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 605 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter SEARCH
AND SEIZURE].
30. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925).
31. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 26, at 163.
32. See id. at 166-67.
33. Kerr, supra note 3, at 568.
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enforcement officers were to carry out a search of John Doe's home for Po-
laroid pictures containing child pornography, they would not be entitled to
open locked containers discovered in the process without a further showing
of probable cause. In the virtual context, however, any encrypted folders or
files can be accessed pursuant to the original warrant. A search warrant
will rarely misidentify the physical object to be searched. It is how the
search is performed within the virtual boundaries of that physical device
that creates the problems when dealing with search warrants for computers.
Although the particularity requirement compels government officials to
specifically define the place to be searched and the anticipated fruits of the
search, the requirement has never been applied to how the search will be
carried out. The particularity requirement has been described as "re-
flect[ing] a physical concern: the thinking is that the law can limit searches
by confining where in the physical world the police search and by naming
the object of the search." 34 In the world of computers, however, specifi-
cally naming the location and object of the search still leaves vast amounts
of data available for the government to inspect. Reinterpreting the Fourth
Amendment to require ex ante search protocols in the computer search con-
text may provide the means to safeguard the huge amounts of information
stored on individual hard drives. While few courts have ventured to under-
take this task, the Northern District of Illinois held in In re Search of 3817
W. West End that the government was required by the Fourth Amendment
to submit a search protocol prior to the issuance of a warrant.3 5 In accor-
dance with a Ninth Circuit ruling, the court reasoned that the degree of
specificity imposed by the particularity requirement "varies depending on
the circumstances of the case and the type[s] of items involved., 36 A key
factor in West End was the court's determination that modem computer
technology enables government agents to specifically tailor searches.
37
While this technology may not be as precise as some would like, it does
enable the government to set forth some type of search protocol that it will
adhere to in order to prevent general searches.
Conversely, other courts have held that the Fourth Amendment does not
require ex ante search protocols. In United States v. Hill, the Ninth Circuit
refused to require such a protocol noting that the reasonableness of the
searching officer's actions would be sufficient to protect the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights.38 The court in Hill did mention, however, that it
34. Id.
35. 321 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
36. Id. at 958 (citing United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986)).
37. See West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 959.
38. 459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006).
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"look[ed] favorably" on the inclusion of a search protocol in the search
warrant though the lack of one was not fatal to the government's case. 39
This sentiment is echoed in the Department of Justice's Manual for Search-
ing and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal
Investigations. 40 While the majority of courts have refused to require law
enforcement to provide ex ante search protocols, there is considerable
movement in the opposite direction and as technology rapidly progresses
the rationales and decisions of the past decade must be revisited.
B. The Private Search Doctrine
The foregoing discussion is moot, however, unless the government or
one of its agents conducts the search. In Burdeau v. McDowell, the Su-
preme Court noted that the Fourth Amendment protects against unlawful
searches and seizures and that protection applies only to governmental ac-
tion.41 Further, the evidence obtained by a private party can be lawfully
used against a defendant.42 Though it took almost sixty years, the Court
finally articulated additional limitations on the private-search doctrine in
Walter v. United States43 and United States v. Jacobsen.44
In Walter, a shipment of eight-millimeter film depicting homosexual ac-
tivities was accidentally shipped to a third-party rather than the intended
consignee. 45 Employees of the company where the shipment was mistak-
enly delivered opened the boxes and discovered many individual boxes of
film.46 These interior boxes had "suggestive drawings" on one side and
"explicit descriptions of the contents" on the other.47 One of the employees
opened "one or two of the boxes" and tried, unsuccessfully, to view the
contents of the film by holding it up to the light.48 There were a total of
871 films in the shipment.49 The employees then called the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, who, after seizing the material, viewed the films on a pro-
39. Id
40. See COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, CRIMINAL Div., U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, pts. I-II (2002) [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL], available at
http://www.usdoj .gov/criminal/cybercrime/s&smanual2002.pdf.
41. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
42. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487-90 (1971).
43. 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
44. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
45. Walter, 447 U.S. at 651.
46. Id. at 651-52.
47. Id. at 652.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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jector "without making any effort to obtain a warrant. 50 The petitioners in
the case were indicted and convicted on obscenity charges and their motion
to suppress the evidence of the pornographic films was denied.5'
The Supreme Court reversed the petitioners' convictions on the grounds
that the government search exceeded the scope of the search conducted by
the private individuals. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Stevens noted
that a limited private search before a government investigation does not
grant the government unlimited authority to search without a warrant.52
Most importantly, the Court noted that the government could not exceed
the scope of the initial private search without a warrant even if the private
search uncovered material that would provide the government with prob-
able cause to believe that the container held illegal material.53 Probable
cause is a prerequisite to obtaining a search warrant, but does not replace a
warrant.
54
Four years later, in Jacobsen, the Supreme Court elaborated on just how
far beyond a private search a government search could go. Jacobsen and a
partner were the intended recipients of a shipment of cocaine via Federal
Express ("FedEx"). The package was damaged by a forklift and subse-
quently inspected by employees pursuant to a contractual provision in
FedEx's insurance policy.55 The package's exterior appeared ordinary and
the inside contained a tube fashioned from duct tape surrounded by crum-
pled newspaper. 56 The FedEx employees cut the tube open revealing four
zip-lock bags filled with white powder.57 The employees then returned the
plastic bags to the tube and the tube to the cardboard box while contacting
agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA").58 When the
DEA agents arrived they reopened the package and, importantly, cut one of
the bags of powder open to perform a field test for cocaine. 59 After the test
revealed the substance was in fact cocaine, other DEA agents obtained a
warrant to search the address where the package was headed and subse-
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 656.
53. Id ("[T]he Government argues that the limited private search justified an unlimited
official search. That argument must fail, whether we view the official search as an expan-
sion of the private search or as an independent search supported by its own probable
cause.").
54. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
55. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984).
56. Id
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 111-12.
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quently arrested Jacobsen and his partner.60 Jacobsen was convicted after
an unsuccessful motion to suppress the evidence at trial based on Walter.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction, how-
ever, on the grounds that the field test for cocaine was "a significant expan-
sion of the earlier private search" and was thus unconstitutional.6 '
Again writing for a majority of the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens re-
versed the Court of Appeals and reinstated Jacobsen's conviction noting
that "[t]he additional invasions of [Jacobsen's] privacy by the government
must be tested by the degree to which they exceeded the scope of the pri-
vate search."62 The Court concluded that, although the DEA agent's field
test of the white powder did exceed the scope of the private search, it was
not a search under the standard articulated in Katz.63 The core of the
court's reasoning was that the field test could "not compromise any legiti-
mate expectation of privacy." 64 The opinion was careful to note that the
fact that the white powder tested positive for cocaine did not factor into the
reasonable expectation of privacy decision.65 What was important was the
fact that whatever the white powder turned out to be was no longer a "pri-
vate fact" and thus there could be no reasonable expectation of privacy in
it.6
6
The foregoing decisions demonstrate that the government may only ex-
ceed the scope of a private search if there is no longer a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the contents of the container or area that was searched.
Accordingly, confirmation of prior knowledge obtained during the private
search would not seem to implicate any Fourth Amendment concerns.6
7
Looking for further direction in the area, however, yields few helpful cases.
As one court has noted, "there is a remarkable dearth of federal jurispru-
dence elaborating on what types of investigative actions constitute exceed-
ing the scope of a private search., 68 Moreover, the few circuit courts to ad-
dress the issue have provided "only limited guidance about the nature of
this inquiry." 69 Two circuits have held that a government search exceeds
the scope of a private search when the government agents examine a con-
60. Id. at 112.
61. Id. (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 683 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1982)).
62. Id. at 115.
63. Id. at 143.
64. Id. at 123.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 463 (5th Cir. 2001).
68. Id. at 461 (internal quotations omitted).
69. Id.
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tainer that was left undisturbed by the private searchers. 70 The Eighth Cir-
cuit took a different approach and held that unwrapping similar undisturbed
items within the container searched by a private party did not exceed the
scope of the private search.7' It is important to note that the Eighth Circuit
did not address whether the undisturbed items (kilogram bricks of cocaine
wrapped in towels and other clothing material within a zippered suitcase)
were separate containers for the purposes of the private search analysis.
The court's reasoning emphasized the language in Jacobsen that stated it
would be possible for no reasonable expectation of privacy to remain in the
contents of a container when it seemed apparent to the trained observer that
the container contained nothing but contraband.72
Therefore, there is still some debate as to when exactly a government
search exceeds the scope of a private one. Both the proper means for
measuring the scope of a private search and exactly what factual situations
would warrant a determination that there is no further reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy remain unaddressed by the Supreme Court. These problems
are compounded in the hard drive context due to inescapable tension that
results from trying to fit emerging technologies into historical doctrines
while remaining faithful to the underlying principles of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
C. Hard Drive Technology
Before delving into the complex issue of whether or not the existing
closed container framework is appropriate, it is important to have a basic
understanding of the technology behind the hard drives at the center of this
debate. A hard disk is defined as "[a] magnetic disk consisting of a rigid
substrate coated or plated-usually on both sides-with a magnetic mate-
rial."713 "The drive itself may contain a number of platters mounted on a
70. See United States v. Kinney, 953 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that a subse-
quent search of a white canvas bag within a closet that had been opened by a private party
exceeded the scope of the private party's search); United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430,
1434 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that when police opened an opaque container that was inside
of a glove discovered and delivered to them by a private party they exceeded the scope of
the private search).
71. United States v. Bowman, 907 F.2d 63, 65 (8th Cir. 1990).
72. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 121 (1984) ("Under these circumstances,
the package could no longer support any expectation of privacy; it was just like a balloon
'the distinctive character [of which] spoke volumes as to its contents, particularly to the
trained eye of the officer."' (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 (1983))).
73. Hard Disk, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING 237 (John Daintith ed., Oxford
University Press 5th ed. 2004).
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rotating spindle."74 These platters can be visualized by imagining a stack
of compact discs packed tightly together. Data, however, is not neatly
stored on these platters the way most people likely envision data being
stored on their operating system. The hard disk "stores data in tracks of
magnetically oriented particles" of which there may be over 10,000 on a
high capacity drive.75 These tracks are divided into smaller units called sec-
tors.76  Importantly, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment analysis,
"[w]hen a file is written to a hard [drive] it is not written in consecutive
sectors. Sectors are scattered all over the disk, organized as a linked
list."'77 Accordingly, data from a single file may be scattered on different
platters in various places on the hard drive.
Another form of hard drive technology that is gaining popularity is
solid-state memory ("SSM"). Also known as semiconductor memory,
SSM is the technology currently utilized in USB flash drives and other
small, portable media. The capacity of SSM has been "increasing by a fac-
tor of four every few years" 78 and the technology is now available in cer-
tain notebook computers. 79 These solid-state devices ("SSD") are "fabri-
cated principally or entirely from solid material" and contain
semiconductors that serve to store the data.80 In short, SSDs contain no
platters or other moving parts; no physical distinction can be made between
platters or any other component parts. They are, for all intents and pur-
poses, small pieces of material that store increasingly large amounts of in-
formation.
II. DISCUSSION: How SHOULD HARD DRIVES BE VIEWED IN THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT CONTEXT?
One of the most significant concerns when dealing with computer tech-
nology and the Fourth Amendment is how to conceptualize hard drives
within the preexisting doctrinal framework. Part II will discuss the current
views that courts have adopted regarding this issue. Part II.A will examine
the "physical box" approach of equating hard drives with closed containers
74. Stephen J. Rogowski, Hard Disk, in CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE
357 (Edwin D. Reilly ed., 2004).
75. Id.
76. Id
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Semiconductor Memory, OxFoRD DICTIONARY, supra note 73, at 471.
79. Apple offers an 128-gigabyte solid state drive for purchase in a notebook computer.
See MacBook Air - Apple Store (U.S.), http://store.apple.com/usIbrowse/home/shopmac/
family/macbook air?mco=MTE3MDc (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
80. Solid-State Device, OxFoRD DICTIONARY, supra note 73, at 494.
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while Part II.B will examine the "virtual file" approach of treating individ-
ual files or folders as the proper zone of a search. Part II.C will then exam-
ine the new approach set forth by the court in United States v. Crist.
After Jacobsen, the paradigm inquiry in determining whether a govern-
ment search exceeds the scope of a prior private search is whether the indi-
vidual retains any reasonable expectation of privacy after the initial search.
Whether or not an individual retains a reasonable expectation of privacy
concerning the information stored on her computer's hard drive is predi-
cated exclusively on how that hard drive is classified. If the hard drive is
analogous to a closed container, as soon as it is accessed the owner forfeits
any reasonable expectation of privacy in the rest of its contents. 81 As men-
tioned above, this has been described as the "physical box" approach.82 On
the other hand, if a hard drive is imagined to be more like a warehouse con-
taining many individual containers-the "virtual file" approach-
additional questions arise as to what expectation of privacy remains after a
portion of the information has been accessed. The approach taken in
United States v. Crist may be deemed a hybrid, though it will become ap-
parent that the rationale mirrors the closed container approach much more
than the virtual file counterpart. Federal courts have employed all three
views in practice and no consensus has been reached.
A. Closed Containers: The "Physical Box" Approach
In United States v. Runyan, the Fifth Circuit employed the physical box
approach.83 Defendant Runyan filed for divorce from his wife, Judith, who
subsequently made several trips to Runyan's home to retrieve items that
purportedly belonged to her.84 During one of these visits Judith observed a
desktop computer surrounded by various types of disks.85 Judith then had a
friend disassemble the computer and take it, along with the various disks,
back to her residence. 86 Back at her home, the friend viewed "approxi-
mately twenty" of the disks that had been removed along with the com-
puter, but none of the ZIP disks, 87 and found that they contained child por-
81. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) (noting that an individual does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a container that had previously been opened by
a customs agent); Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 447, 656 (1980) (noting that the boxes
that had been opened by the private parties were subject to a permissible government
search).
82. Kerr, supra note 3, at 554.
83. 275 F.3d 449, 463-64 (5th Cir. 2001).
84. Id. at 452.
85. Id. at 453.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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nography. 88 Judith and the friend promptly contacted the authorities and
turned over "twenty-two CDs, ten ZIP disks, and eleven floppy disks to the
deputy [who responded to the call]." 89 After an investigation, a Customs
Service Special Agent was assigned to the case and viewed images from
every piece of evidence turned over to the authorities. A subsequently-
filed affidavit also stipulated that another officer involved in the case had
engaged in a "cursory review" of all the "computer storage media." 90 Run-
yan was indicted on federal child pornography charges and moved to sup-
press the evidence obtained in the pre-warrant searches of the media turned
over to authorities by his wife. 9'
Runyan's Fourth Amendment challenges were brought on two
grounds-first, that the private parties had only searched a random assort-
ment of the disks while the government agents searched all of them, and
second, that the government agents examined more images on each disk
than the private searchers. 92 The first theory mirrors the physical box ap-
proach. Runyan was apparently conceding under this theory that once the
private party had accessed a disk, the reasonable expectation of privacy
was lost. The second theory Runyan advanced was akin to the virtual file
approach in that Runyan was implicitly arguing that he still had a reason-
able expectation of privacy in images that were not viewed, but were on the
disks accessed by the private search.
The Fifth Circuit noted that each disk93 was an individual closed con-
tainer for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis.94 The court further ex-
plained that the government exceeds the scope of a private search if it ex-
amines closed containers that were not opened initially, unless they are
"substantially certain of what is inside the container based on the state-
ments of the private searchers, their replication of the private search, and
their expertise." 95 The court held that there was no possible way the police
officers in question could have been "substantially certain" the unexamined
disks also contained child pornography and thus, the subsequent search of
all the disks violated Runyan's Fourth Amendment rights under the private
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 454-55.
91. Id. at 455.
92. Id. at 460.
93. The Runyan court failed to address the issue of whether the hard drive in the seized
desktop computer was a single closed container, seemingly because the incriminating child
pornography was located exclusively on the disks and not the computer.
94. Runyan, 275 F.3d at 464.
95. Id. at 463.
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search doctrine.96 As to Runyan's second theory, the virtual file approach,
the court was not as accommodating. The court explicitly stated, "[I]n the
context of a closed container search ... the police do not exceed [a] private
search when they examine more items within a closed container than did
the private searchers." 97 This rationale was based on the fear of over-
deterrence. The Fifth Circuit explained that if the virtual file approach
were adopted, government agents would be "disinclined to examine even
containers that had already been [privately searched] for fear of coming
across important evidence that the private searchers did not happen to see
and that would then be subject to suppression." 98
First and foremost, proponents of the view espoused in Runyan claim
that defining hard drives as closed containers provides the most workable
solution to a potentially massive problem. 99 Because of the numerous prac-
tical problems that arise when labeling hard drives as anything other than
closed containers, the Runyan-doctrine advocates the claim that any other
conceptualization of hard drives will lead to absurd results. If a search was
deemed unconstitutional every time a government agent stumbled upon
something within a closed container that had not been first examined by the
private searchers, the government agents would be over-deterred and shy
away from conducting searches to the fullest extent of their abilities. 100 If
government agents were to exceed the scope of a private search any time
they examined something not previously searched by the private party, it
could also result in wasting police time and resources. 01 Moreover, when
search warrants come into play there are numerous conceptual problems
with limiting the zone and scope of search within the virtual environment
of the hard drive.
Some scholars echo this view. 102 In particular, Professor Thomas Clancy
argues that classifying hard drives as single closed containers will not have
the disastrous effect of allowing "wholesale searches of data" on computers
under investigation by the government. 10 3 The underlying assumption with
this viewpoint is that all files on a hard drive may be scanned to ascertain
their relevancy, though anything outside the scope of the warrant or prior
private search will be suppressed. Similar to the rationale invoked by
96. Id. at 464.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 465.
99. See generally Clancy, supra note 13.
100. See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 465.
101. See id.
102. See generally Clancy, supra note 13.
103. Id. at 199.
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courts in file cabinet cases, this view assumes that there is no better way to
separate data than manually examining each and every piece of information
to determine its relevancy to an investigation.
While the foregoing distinction may be viable in the physical context of
file cabinets and similar objects, it may not withstand scrutiny in the virtual
world. Further, this possibility is fraught with potential privacy infringe-
ments, regardless of whether the information will be admissible at trial. It
is hard to imagine how demarcating the zone of search and conceptualizing
a hard drive as one closed container will not allow wholesale searches of
the entire hard drive. Indeed, one can easily imagine an overzealous U.S.
Attorney seeking a warrant for "financial records" on a large bank's com-
puter system and then engaging in a wholesale search for any and all evi-
dence of criminal activity. Perhaps the only saving grace to privacy rights
hidden in this rationale is that incriminating evidence may possibly be sup-
pressed if a judge finds ex post that it was discovered improperly. Whether
or not this protection is enough to adequately safeguard privacy rights,
however, is debatable.
B. Virtual Warehouses: The "Virtual File" Approach
Not every circuit court to address the issue has discredited the virtual file
approach. In United States v. Carey the Tenth Circuit held that images of
child pornography that were discovered incident to a search for evidence of
drug sales were not admissible. 10 4 Carey had been under investigation for
possible sale and possession of narcotics when he consented to a search of
his residence. 10 5 During this initial search the police discovered two com-
puters, which they subsequently seized and obtained a warrant to search for
"names, telephone numbers, ledger receipts, addresses, and other documen-
tary evidence pertaining to the sale and distribution of controlled sub-
stances."' 10 6 After an initial search of file types that would traditionally
harbor evidence of drug crimes turned up nothing, one of the detectives be-
gan examining JPG files-a file type associated with images.'l 7 The first
JPG file that the officer opened contained an image of child pornogra-
phy. 10 8 After discovering this image, the officer downloaded the remaining
JPG files-approximately 244-onto nineteen disks and viewed a handful
104. 172 F.3d 1268, 1276 (10th Cir. 1999), reh'g denied.
105. 1d. at 1270.
106. Id. at 1272-73 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. at 1271.
108. Id.
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of files on each disk.10 9 Carey was then indicted on child pornography
charges as well as drug charges."10
Holding that the search of the JPG files exceeded the scope of the war-
rant, the court stressed that the officer's suspicion changed immediately
upon viewing the first file containing child pornography and the subsequent
search of all the computer's JPG files was not judicially authorized."' In
dicta, however, the Tenth Circuit cautioned that "relying on analogies to
closed containers or file cabinets may lead courts to oversimplify a com-
plex area of Fourth Amendment doctrines and ignore the realities of mas-
sive modem computer storage." 112 A central underlying assumption in
Carey was that the defendant's hard drive was not a single closed con-
tainer. By ruling that an officer could exceed the scope of a warrant while
searching a computer, the Tenth Circuit advanced quite a different view
than was espoused in Runyan. In terms of the hard drive, "the relevant unit
of search, at least in the case of digital images, is an individual file."
113
The rationale behind the decision in Carey was straightforward. The
court made it abundantly clear that analogizing Carey's hard drive to one
closed container would enable the government to perform a general ex-
ploratory search-a result the court was unwilling to allow. And while the
general idea motivating the decision appears proper, the implementation of
the virtual file approach within the decision presented one glaring problem:
the Carey court was unwilling to advocate an ex ante search protocol re-
quirement for search warrants issued for hard drives. Instead, the court re-
lied heavily on the subjective intent of the government agent who executed
the search in determining the constitutionality of the scope of the search."l 4
On the surface, bringing the subjective intent of the searching officer ap-
pears to be a workable way to limit the scope of the searches pursuant to a
constitutional warrant. The entire realm of Fourth Amendment doctrine
can be said to revolve around the subjective component of reasonableness,
that is, striking a reasonable balance between individual privacy and the
proper power of law enforcement."15 In the context of executing search
warrants, however, the Supreme Court has explicitly noted that the subjec-
tive intent of the searching officer cannot be used to invalidate the scope of
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1270.
111. Id. at 1273.
112. Id. at 1275 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
113. Kerr, supra note 3, at 555.
114. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273 ("We infer from his testimony Detective Lewis knew he
was expanding the scope of his search when he sought to open the JPG files.").
115. See generally SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 29, at 4-5 (discussing how courts
have used the probable cause requirement to strike this balance).
994 [Vol. XXXVI
HOW SAFE IS YOUR DATA?
a search conducted pursuant to an objectively sufficient warrant. In Horton
v. California the Court explicitly noted that objective standards limit the
scope of the warrant and the subjective intent of the officer cannot come
into play.1 16 Further, in Whren v. United States the Court rejected the idea
that "an officer's motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under
the Fourth Amendment.""' 7 Carey failed to address these concerns, as did
the Tenth Circuit's subsequent decisions that refined the Carey rationale. 1 8
There was no discussion in Carey of whether the warrant involved was ob-
jectively sufficient. Without some sort of reformulation or clarification, it
does not appear that the virtual file approach in Carey can be harmonized
with existing Fourth Amendment doctrinal points espoused in Horton and
Whren.
C. A New Approach?: United States v. Crist
In the near decade following Runyan and Carey, courts remained silent
on how to properly conceptualize a hard drive in terms of the Fourth
Amendment. The issue piqued only minimal interest from scholars despite
the seeming enormity of the potential problem." 9 At the time Carey and
Runyan were decided, hard drive capacity was a fraction of what it has be-
come today. Less than a decade ago in 2001, for example, a common home
computer would typically have contained a twenty-gigabyte hard drive. 120
As discussed above, earlier this year Western Digital introduced the
world's first two-terabyte hard drive. With the ever-expanding storage ca-
pacities of computer memory, equating a hard drive with a single closed
container would apparently enable government officials' to access un-
precedented amounts of information based on a private individual viewing
one illicit image file or a search warrant for something as simple-and rela-
tively tiny-as an e-mail correspondence.
In late 2008, the issue once again came to the forefront of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. In United States v. Crist, a court delivered
116. 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990).
117. 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996).
118. See United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Cam-
pos, 221 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2000). For an in-depth discussion of the conflict between
Carey and Horton, see David J. S. Ziff, Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations on the Execu-
tion of Computer Searches Conducted Pursuant to a Warrant, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 841
(2005).
119. See generally Clancy, supra note 13; Kerr, supra note 3.
120. See Kerr, supra note 3, at 542 (noting that in 2005-four years after Runyan and six
years after Carey-the typical capacity of a hard drive was eighty gigabytes; the twenty
gigabyte estimation is based on the assumption that computer storage capacities tend to
double every two years).
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what on its face appeared to be a victory for privacy advocates.12' At first
glance, it seemed as if the court moved away from the closed container ap-
proach, but a closer inspection of the court's rationale makes that conclu-
sion tenuous at best.
The story began when Robert Crist failed to pay his rent on time. After
a few months of nonpayment, Crist's landlord hired two men to remove the
belongings from Crist's apartment. 122 After taking photographs of the in-
side of the apartment for documentation purposes, the men moved Crist's
scant belongings onto the curb outside for trash pickup. 123 One of the men
informed a friend who was looking for a computer that Crist's computer
would be outside the apartment; the friend, Seth Hipple, picked up the
computer shortly thereafter and took it back to his residence. 124 Upon
learning of what was happening at his residence and not being able to lo-
cate his computer, Crist called the police and reported the computer sto-
len. 125 In the meantime, Hipple had brought the computer to his home and
tried to "get it running. "126 After Hipple looked through "a 'bunch of
songs' on a media folder," he opened "a couple of video files depicting
children performing sexual acts."' 27 After viewing these files Hipple de-
leted the entire folder and, a few days later, contacted the local police de-
partment. 28 After the computer was entered into evidence, the Pennsyl-
vania Attorney General's Office took custody of the computer in order to
conduct a forensic analysis on the hard drive.129
The forensic analysis of Crist's hard drive was thorough. The agent took
an MD5 hash value of the drive, which is a "'fingerprint' or [kind of] 'digi-
tal DNA"' of the drive, and created a copy.130 The agent then analyzed the
copy-not the actual hard drive from Crist's computer-using a program
called EnCase.' 3 ' EnCase does not function in the traditional manner of
looking through files or folders; instead, it "reads every file-bit by bit,
cluster by cluster-and creates an index of the files contained on the hard
drive."'132 The agent from the Attorney General's Office then performed a
121. No. 1:07-CR-211, 2008 WL 4682806 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2008).
122. Id. at *1.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *1-2.
129. Id. at *2.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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signature analysis on all the hash values on the hard drive and compared
them to a database containing hash values of known and suspected'3 3 child
pornography.134 After this analysis was complete the agent discovered five
video files containing known child pornography and 171 video files con-
taining suspected child pornography.' 35 Further analysis turned up almost
1,600 images of known or suspected child pornography. 136 Crist was sub-
sequently indicted on two counts of knowingly receiving and possessing
digital images and video files containing child pornography in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(A) & 2252A(b).137
The district court ruled to suppress any evidence found that was not un-
covered by Hipple. 138 In doing so, the court noted that the EnCase analysis
constituted a search that exceeded the scope of the initial private search:
"the rationale for authorizing warrantless searches in Jacobsen is that the
private search was so complete, no privacy interest remained. That is cer-
tainly not the case here."' 39 The court, however, did not stop there. It re-
jected the government's contention that a hard drive was a single closed
container, justifying this rationale on the fact that hard drives contain many
internal "platters" and each of those platters was analogous to a separate
container as discussed in Runyan.140
The district court's opinion in Crist seemingly set out to champion pri-
vacy rights and serve as a new model for courts to follow when dealing
with searches of hard drives. The decision was adamant that the prior pri-
vate search of a few videos did not compromise the reasonable expectation
of privacy regarding the remainder of the hard drive's contents. Moreover,
the court was careful to make clear that a hard drive could not be classified
as one single closed container.
While the task was admirable and served to protect the instant privacy
rights of Crist, the logic appears faulty. As soon as the court made the leap
and declared that Crist's hard drive was not analogous to a single closed
container, the logic began to unravel. If the court had simply stopped after
making this distinction it would have produced another decision in the vir-
tual file camp that could be elaborated-upon by courts in the future. In-
133. "Known" child pornography is pornography in which the name of the victim is
known. "Suspected" child pornography includes files which "[contain] depictions of child
pornography but the name of the victim is not known." Id. at n.3.
134. Id. at *2.
135. Id.
136. Id. at *3.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *13.
139. Id. at *9.
140. Id. at*10.
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stead, the court delved into the platter discussion and made the mistake of
stating "[e]ach platter, as opposed to the hard drive in its entirety, is analo-
gous to a single disk."'14' This platter distinction simply does not comport
with the privacy-protecting ideals of the virtual file approach. While pro-
tecting privacy rights in hard drives for the time being, the platter distinc-
tion creates more questions than it resolves. For example, the court failed
to discuss what data was contained on each platter, how much data was
contained on each platter, or if it was even possible to make such determi-
nations. In effect, all the court did was adopt the physical box approach of
Runyan, but instead of a pile of disks sitting on a desk, there was a pile of
disks symmetrically mounted inside of a metal casing that was fastened to
the interior of a desktop computer. Essentially, all Crist does is reaffirm
the closed container approach on a micro scale. As soon as it becomes pos-
sible to determine with exactitude what information each platter contains,
government agents will be able to conduct wholesale searches of each plat-
ter. Considering the size of modem hard drives it does not seem radical to
suggest that individual platters will at some point contain as much informa-
tion as entire hard drives did in the recent past.
Lastly, when taken to its logical conclusion, the Crist rationale is, effec-
tively, the virtual file approach. The court stated that the entire hard drive
could not be a single closed container, so it pared the size of the container
down based on a physical distinction it evidently believed would remain
constant. 142 As long as manufacturers continue to employ the same hard
drive design there will be platters to designate as separate closed contain-
ers. The virtual file approach can be viewed as simply paring the Crist ap-
proach down further, making the singular closed container the individual
file or folder on the platter. There are obvious differences-the virtual file
being virtual as opposed to physical, for one thing-but the extrapolation is
not far-fetched.
In sum, Runyan represents the closed container approach formulated in
2001, the practical result of which is to leave enormous amounts of infor-
mation easily susceptible to government search even if most of that infor-
mation has nothing to do with what the government is investigating. Con-
versely, Carey, decided in 1999 and reiterated by the Tenth Circuit in 2001,
attempts to remove hard drives and computers from the traditional Fourth
Amendment realm and adopts a somewhat more advanced approach.143 By
141. Id.
142. Id. at *10.
143. See Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (explaining that the traditional file
cabinet analogy is inadequate for dealing with hard drives and a more complex standard is
needed for computer technology).
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holding that it is possible for a government agent to exceed the scope of a
warrant to search a hard drive, the Tenth Circuit made clear that a hard
drive is not simply a single closed container, but failed to elaborate on ex-
actly how they should be viewed. As would be expected from such a rul-
ing, the result of this approach is a constant uncertainty, at least in the ju-
risdictions that follow suit, concerning how search warrants regarding hard
drives must be specified and when government agents' actions exceed the
scope of those warrants or prior private searches. Moreover, it has been
almost a decade since a circuit court has ruled on this issue. While in other
areas of the law a decade may not seem like much, when dealing with
computer technology ten years can make a world of difference. For in-
stance, ten years ago most people still used dial-up connections to get
online and "streaming video" consisted of endless waiting for pages to load
and then watching choppy and grainy video. Today fiber-optic intemet
connections are wired directly into the home and streaming high-definition
movies are commonplace. The issue of how computer searches should
properly be executed is one that must be addressed as quickly as possible
considering the speed with which technology develops.
III. ARGUMENT: A NEW APPROACH-VIRTUAL FILES AND SEARCH
PROTOCOLS
At this juncture, Runyan and Carey exemplify the two dominant ap-
proaches courts have taken when dealing with the issue of hard drive clas-
sification under the Fourth Amendment. Crist remains an outlier and, as
will be explained below, does not appear to be a feasible doctrinal solution
moving forward. The massive storage capacities of modem hard drives
coupled with the always-expanding use of personal computers would result
in exposure of far too much private information if a closed container ap-
proach were to be accepted.
Part III of this Note proposes a modified approach to hard drive classifi-
cation that attempts to avoid the pitfalls of both the Carey and Crist formu-
lations. Part III.A will examine the problems inherent in both the physical
box and virtual file approaches while Part III.B will propose adopting a
modified virtual file approach as a workable solution to these complex
problems. Finally, Part III.C will examine the practical effects of applying
the proposed approach to the cases discussed above.
A. Two Problematic Approaches
Adopting the physical box approach could have disastrous and absurd
results. As described above, conceptualizing hard drives as closed contain-
ers can lead to individuals forfeiting their reasonable expectations of pri-
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vacy in vast amounts of personal data. A few practical examples highlight
this concern. Imagine a network server that provides a large number of
workstations with access to network disk drives.14 4 These shared disk
drives contain the information of countless individuals.145 Employing the
closed container formulation to these drives would effectively extinguish
other individuals' reasonable expectations of privacy in their stored data if
data from just one user were the subject of a search warrant. The same
problem with the closed container approach arises in the context of shared
computers. Under the closed container approach, a family man and CEO
suspected of conversing electronically about financial improprieties on his
family's shared computer would serve to forfeit the expectation of privacy
in his wife's personal data stored on the same hard drive.
The platter rationale adopted in Crist is similarly problematic and will
fail to protect individual privacy the way the court envisioned. While at-
tempting to protect privacy of individuals' data in the information age, the
platter approach fails to safeguard privacy of data in SSM as discussed
above, USB drives, CD or DVD media, or any other storage mechanism
that has separate and definable parts. Moreover, the rationale is faulty even
in the realm of the hard drives it purports to protect. While it may be pos-
sible to detect what platter an individual file is stored on, many systems
permit file fragmentation. File fragmentation results in individual files be-
ing broken down into smaller chunks and being stored in a variety of places
across the hard drive. 146 This can result in one file being stored on multiple
platters. It would seem to cut against the rationale of the court's decision in
Crist to say that a user whose computer enabled file fragmentation would
lose a reasonable expectation of privacy in multiple platters, but the lucky
user whose computer did not, would be entitled to more protection under
the Fourth Amendment. Further, with the emergence of solid-state drives
and other media that do not fit into the traditional mold, platters may soon
become a thing of the past. Once these devices with non-moving parts be-
come widely available, courts employing the Crist rationale will have no
choice but to resort to the closed container approach and take a huge step
back from protecting privacy rights. In a virtual world, simply turning one
physical closed container into a series of smaller ones does not solve the
privacy problem.
144. A server is an administrative computer that controls the access to a computer net-
work and its resources. MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY 403-04 (4th ed. 1999).
145. Kerr, supra note 3, at 556 (noting how a single physical storage device can contain
the private files of thousands of different users).
146. MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY, supra note 144, at 195.
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The foregoing examples highlight a few of the problems presented by
the closed container approach. As noted in Part II.B, however, the virtual
file approach is problematic in its own ways. Including an ex ante search
protocol requirement can adequately handle the subjective intent problems
that are thrust into play when implementing the virtual file approach and
keep it in line with the fundamental holdings of both Horton and Whren.
B. Virtual Files and Search Protocols: A Proposal
The virtual file approach is the best way to classify hard drives under the
Fourth Amendment. The term "virtual file approach" is worthless, how-
ever, unless courts have some practical guidance on how to implement and
apply it.147 This Part proposes a modified two-part approach to the virtual
file classification that will hopefully solve the problems created by both
Carey and Crist. First and most importantly, the proper zone of a hard
drive search must be the virtual files and folders contained on the drive.
Exactly how narrow to draw this distinction on the virtual level can be de-
bated; what cannot, however, is that any distinction on the physical level is
simply unworkable if individual privacy is to be adequately protected.
Second, courts must re-conceptualize the Fourth Amendment's particular-
ity requirement in the computer context and require ex ante search proto-
cols that lay out exactly how the hard drive will be examined by forensic
analysts. The technology to pinpoint data exists. 14 8 This technology may
not be perfect, but using it to search for files without indiscriminately view-
ing everything on an individual's computer is the best method available at
this juncture to safeguard privacy.
This proposal will function to limit the invasiveness of government
searches in two ways. First, in the context of the private search doctrine,
government agents will not be able to exceed the scope of the prior private
search by any means. This development will be consistent with the tenets
of Walter and Jacobsen. Because the proper zone of the search should be
147. The Tenth Circuit declined to extend Carey to require a search protocol in United
States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246, 1251 (10th Cir. 2005). As discussed infra, however, sim-
ply imposing the virtual file approach without an ex ante search protocol requirement calls
for courts to interpret the searching officer's subjective intent. Requiring courts to examine
this subjective intent is not only violative of the Supreme Court's holding in Horton v. Cali-
fornia, but also impractical and difficult to apply ex post.
148. Forensic analysis programs for computers advance with each passing day. For in-
stance, Guidance Software's "EnCase" program advertises "Smart Evidence Collection: No
other forensic tool gives organizations the ability to forensically preserve only the relevant
evidence without capturing the entire hard drive." GUIDANCE SOFTWARE, ENCASE ENTER-
PRISE FOR EDUCATION 2 (2006), http://www.bestnetworksecurity.com/images/uploads/
guidance-for-education.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
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limited to the already-examined virtual files, anything beyond that would
violate the Fourth Amendment. For example, if the private search uncov-
ered evidence of child pornography, the government agents would ostensi-
bly have probable cause to obtain a search warrant to search that hard drive
for further instances of child pornography. The same principle would ap-
ply if the private search uncovered a spreadsheet documenting the owner's
drug sales. It is in this way that limiting the zone of search to individual
files or folders will aid law enforcement as well. Police officers or gov-
ernment agents conducting forensic searches will no longer need to worry
about the proper scope of their examination subsequent to a private search
or pursuant to a broad warrant. Requiring a search protocol on top of insti-
tuting the virtual file approach will assure law enforcement officials that
any evidence they obtain will be admissible against the defendant. Second,
as mentioned briefly above, interpreting the particularity requirement to
necessitate the submission of search protocols will serve to limit the evi-
dence the government can constitutionally view and extract from a hard
drive pursuant to a warrant.
C. Application in Practice: How Would a Modified Approach Work?
Exemplifying just how a modified virtual file approach will function in
practice will provide insight into its benefits. In terms of the private search
doctrine, the application would be straightforward. The fundamental prob-
lem that courts encounter when dealing with hard drives that have previ-
ously been searched by a private party is the question of proper scope. 149
Once the zone of search is determined to be the virtual file, scope is no
longer an issue in private search doctrine cases. The defendant will lose
her reasonable expectation of privacy in whatever files were examined by
the private party and nothing else. The government agent must obtain a
search warrant based on probable cause in order to search anything aside
from these previously examined files-a burden that does not impermissi-
bly impede the agent's ability to adequately perform her duty. The applica-
tion of the proposed new approach to such a search warrant will be dis-
cussed below.
Applying the modified virtual file approach in Crist would have resulted
in an identical district court ruling, albeit based on a quite different ration-
ale. All the evidence obtained by the forensic examination other than the
files initially viewed by the private searcher would have to be suppressed.
149. See generally United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223 (5th Cir. 2002); United States
v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Crist, No. 1:07-CR-211, 2008
WL 4682806 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2008).
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As soon as the investigators examined anything else on Crist's hard drive,
they impermissibly violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The same logic
applies to Runyan. Instead of the court suppressing evidence located on
disks that had not been accessed by Runyan's wife and her companion, the
court would have had to suppress any evidence discovered aside from the
actual image files viewed during the course of the private search.
As is evident from these examples, the virtual file approach was not par-
ticularly problematic in the context of the private search doctrine. In fact, it
serves its purpose with little controversy-individual privacy is protected
and government agents are not hamstrung because they will, in most cases,
be able to obtain a search warrant based on probable cause from the private
search. It is when these search warrants are then executed, however, that
the larger problems appear. Requiring an ex ante search protocol is the
best way to resolve these problems while remaining faithful to the tradi-
tional Fourth Amendment balance between individual privacy from gov-
ernment intrusion and law enforcement agent's ability to adequately per-
form their investigatory duties.
Looking at Carey through the lens of this modified approach will better
serve to illustrate its practical effect on the search warrant process. The
subjective intent of the officer who conducted the search would not be
relevant under the proposed standard. For the sake of the argument, as-
sume that a search protocol was implemented and specified that documents
related to Carey's suspected drug sales would be targeted using file names,
file extensions, and file headers. Under this hypothetical search protocol
all of the image files uncovered would be suppressed. The searching offi-
cer in Carey saw the incriminating file name and opened the file accord-
ingly-this constitutes a separate search under the virtual file approach.
Because the officer opened these image files-which have distinct file
headers, names, and extensions from any text, spreadsheet, or other file that
could be used to store drug sale information-he impermissibly extended
the search beyond what was specified in the protocol. And while this result
would seem to let Carey "get away with" a heinous act, it is important to
note that the application of the modified virtual file approach would neither
frustrate law enforcement operations nor make it easier for individuals who
have committed crimes to keep them hidden. For instance, if an officer or
analyst were carrying out a search pursuant to the aforementioned hypo-
thetical protocol and discovered a file entitled "childporn.JPG," sufficient
probable cause would be apparent for the issuance of a new warrant with a
new search protocol. And while this process may seem cumbersome, it is
no more so than requiring police officers to obtain a warrant to search a
locked container within a home that they are already permissibly searching.
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Outside of a few longstanding exceptions, courts do not allow police to en-
ter and search an area because of their subjective "certainty."
While it has been stated that "the particularity requirement does less and
less work as the storage capacity of computer devices gets greater and
greater,"15 the call for an ex ante search protocol requirement has been
muted. One of the foremost scholars on computer technology and the law
has expressly rejected the idea as "serv[ing] little purpose."' 151 Those op-
posed to a search protocol requirement state numerous reasons in support
of their case. The most pervasive arguments are that: ex ante regulation is
more costly and time consuming; 152 defendants may have taken steps to
disguise incriminating evidence; forensic analysts rarely know ahead of
time exactly how they will attack a hard drive; and federal judges are ill-
equipped to determine what search protocol will be the most effective and
least invasive. 153 While compelling, these reasons do not tip the scales so
far against ex ante search protocols as to make them wasteful or inappro-
priate.
Technology is constantly evolving. Forensic investigation programs be-
come more refined with each passing version. While defendants may in-
deed disguise incriminating evidence, there is technology to identify files
even when the extensions and names have been altered.' 54 Forensic ana-
lysts can conduct searches at both the logical and physical levels' 55 without
opening the files involved. 156 Searching based on file headers or hash val-
ues enables analysts to find the evidence sought without indiscriminately
opening and sifting through the mountains of personal data that may be
completely irrelevant to the ongoing investigation. For instance, the Span-
ish Guardia Civil Computer Crime Unit has developed a search engine to
find known hash values of illegally shared files on peer-to-peer file sharing
networks.' 57 Similar to the database of hash values used in the Crist inves-
tigation, these search engines can be used to narrowly tailor searches of
computers suspected of containing illegal material.
150. Kerr, supra note 3, at 565-66.
151. Id. at 576.
152. See SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 29 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
153. Kerr, supra note 3, at 575-76.
154. For example, even if a defendant had changed the filename and extension of a
known image of child pornography, a hash value comparison would uncover the image re-
gardless.
155. See Kerr, supra note 3, at 544.
156. See id. at 544-45 (discussing how analysts can conduct file name searches, file ex-
tension searches, and file header searches-all of which may search files for specific in-
stances of criminality without viewing the contents of those files).
157. See United States v. Cartier, 543 F.3d 442, 444 (8th Cir. 2008).
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Further, while forensic analysts may not know ahead of time the precise
course of action they will take in examining a hard drive, asking them to
collaborate with government officials in preparing a guided search protocol
does not require perfection. It is true that there is no "perfect tool" that can
pinpoint exactly what government officials are searching for while at the
same time keeping other information free from inspection.15 8 A lack of
such a tool should not, however, result in wholesale searches of computers
simply because a perfect system cannot be implemented. If seeking pirated
music and video files, the government can submit a protocol specifying that
hash values of known pirated media be compared to hash values on the de-
fendant's computer. If, on the other hand, the government is searching for
an incriminating e-mail correspondence between two members of a com-
pany's board of directors, they can specify that they will target specific
words and phrases as well as the types of files that traditionally contain e-
mail. The fact remains that even if these tailored searches reveal unex-
pected information, there will still be ex post judicial review available to
deal with these unforeseen issues. Requiring the search protocol ahead of
time will limit the discretion of the searching officer or forensic analyst and
curb the chance of general exploratory searches.
As for the concern about judges being ill-equipped to deal with the in-
vestigatory process, it appears to be a matter of perspective. One should
not assume that judges are ignorant of new technologies and the effect they
have on existing constitutional standards. Judicial institutes exist across the
country where judges can register for seminars and classes to keep them-
selves abreast of cutting-edge developments in the judicial world. 159 These
institutes deal with topics ranging from how to handle alternative dispute
resolution to the growing use of transnational legal authority and the impact
on courts in the United States. 160 It is true that judges are not as technically
skilled as forensic computer analysts and computer scientists. Judges, es-
pecially in the context of authorizing search warrants, are protectors of
constitutional rights. Requiring search protocols does not also require
members of the judiciary to hold advanced degrees in computer science any
more than the introduction of DNA evidence require judges to be experts in
158. The "perfect tool" is what Orin Kerr entitled a theoretical forensic analysis program
that could locate exactly what a warrant is looking for without compromising any other in-
formation on the computer. See Kerr, supra note 3, at 570.
159. See, e.g., Colo. Judicial Inst., http://www.coloradojudicialinstitute.org (last visited
July 27, 2009); Flaschner Judicial Inst., Inc., http://www.flaschner.org (last visited July 22,
2009); Mich. Judicial Inst., http://courts.michigan.gov/mji (last visited July 22, 2009); N.Y.
State Judicial Inst., http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/judicialinstitute/index.shtml (last visited
July 22, 2009).
160. Mich. Judicial Inst., supra note 159.
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biochemistry. The government officials involved can prepare a brief de-
scription of the process that will be employed and what that process entails.
It may take time to acclimate to such a procedure initially, but as the prac-
tice becomes more commonplace judges will become more accustomed to
the practice and better prepared to deal with the situations presented. Just a
few years ago, the practice of electronic discovery also perplexed many
judges. As the practice exploded in prevalence and importance, however,
judges became more and more familiar with the requirements and proc-
esses involved. The same approach can be employed with search proto-
cols. The introduction of a search protocol standard is by no means the end
of the line for computers and the Fourth Amendment. Just as any major
development in the legal world, defining the "right" approach to searching
hard drives under the Fourth Amendment is a continuing process that will
inevitably change as the technology involved evolves. The court in West
End started the process and others can now follow accordingly.
This ex ante search protocol requirement may seem revolutionary when
examined in light of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the physical con-
text, but in the virtual context it is simply extending the same protections
that individuals are afforded through a different framework. The complexi-
ties and technological issues behind computers and hard drives make these
search protocols necessary in order to extend Fourth Amendment protec-
tions for physical information to its virtual counterpart. Requiring search
protocols is certainly not an uncontroversial decision. It is, however, a de-
cision that can adequately strike a balance between the need for law en-
forcement to obtain evidence and the privacy rights of this nation's citi-
zenry. That balance is, and always has been, at the crux of any Fourth
Amendment inquiry. 161
CONCLUSION
Conceptualizing hard drives under the Fourth Amendment has proven to
be anything but an easy task. Contrary to what closed container approach
advocates would have people believe, there is too much private information
at stake to allow police or forensic analysts to conduct wholesale searches
based on a warrant that is constitutionally required to specifically describe
the nature of the evidence to be seized. Just because it is not feasible for a
"perfect tool" to be developed by forensic analysts does not mean that there
161. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) ("The touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and,
on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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should be no check against general exploratory searches in the virtual set-
ting. Providing ex post judicial review of computer searches is not enough;
the private information on the computer is still compromised-even if only
viewed by the government officials and analysts involved. With the ever-
expanding range of sensitive information individuals store on their com-
puters, compromising the information to just one party is enough to lead to
identity theft or a bevy of other unsavory results.
While the virtual file approach spelled out in Carey has its challenges,
the alternative of classifying hard drives as single closed containers is
fraught with constitutional problems. Adhering to the physical box model
neglects the fact that computer technology is flundamentally different than
anything the Fourth Amendment has been applied to in the past. Relying
on determinations made by courts over a decade ago seems counterintuitive
when one realizes the staggering speed at which computer technology
evolves and improves. Modifying the virtual file approach to require
search protocols, and thus rid itself of the inquiry into the searching offi-
cer's subjective intent, provides a workable model courts can employ-a
model that will protect individual privacy while at the same time aiding law
enforcement with proper guidance to carry out searches and ensuring that
evidence discovered will be admissible at trial.
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